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Interpretation in Dance Performing1
Most aesthetics philosophers in the analytic tradition discuss interpretation
from what will here be called the critical-philosophical perspective – they
consider interpretation of art as part of the function of an evaluating
appreciator who is seeking to both identify and to understand a static art
object, such as a painting, sculpture, text, or structure, whether real or
abstract. This essay, however, is on the role and function of the dance
performer, the person who is dancing in a kind of dance-as-art event that is
designed for and performed for an audience that perceives, witnesses,
experiences, and appreciates the dance in various ways. As such this chapter
focuses on a component of dance practice that diverges from criticalphilosophical practice in two ways: 1) it is from the point of view of an
embodied person engaged in a dynamic process, and 2) the dance as art on
which this perspective focuses is itself treated as a process or event that need
is neither static nor necessarily enduring – it could be ephemeral in the sense
that it may not have identical features from performance to performance. My
particular focus within this framework will be to consider to what extent is
the dance performer an interpreter, and if she is an interpreter, in what
sense, and what does she interpret? This paper thus seeks to better
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understand the nature of dance performance in practice by analyzing the role
of the dance performer’s contribution in light of any interpretive function she
might have.
To begin, I will survey some leading theories on the interpretation of
art, from Susan Sontag, Arthur Danto, and Joseph Margolis, and from there
construct a working and open definition of interpretation in art that can be
applied to dance-as-art, by which I means the kind of concert dance that is
offered for experience, appreciation, and understanding as art. From there
this definition will be used to identify two dance-performance-related
practices that I think do count as interpretation in this sense, and I will
demonstrate how the dance performer might meet these conditions. Finally, I
will consider briefly, and as a promissory note for a more all-encompassing
theory of the dancer’s role in dance performance, what the dance performer
might be doing that is not best understood as interpretation.
In her famous 1961 essay, ‘Against Interpretation’, Susan Sontag says:
…I don’t mean interpretation in the broadest sense, the sense
in which Nietzsche (rightly) says, “There are no facts, only
interpretations”. By interpretation, I mean a conscious act of
the mind which illustrates a certain code, certain “rules” of
interpretation.
Directed to art, interpretation means plucking a set of
elements (the X, the Y, the Z, and so forth) from the whole
work. The task of interpretation is virtually one of translation.
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The interpreter says, Look, don’t you see that X is really—or,
really means—A? That Y is really B? That Z is really C? (S.
Sontag 1961, p. 5).
According to Sontag, this is classical interpretation, and it re-writes and
alters the artwork, even though the interpreter claims to be identifying the
work’s true meaning. She says that the modern style of interpretation is even
worse because it “excavates, and as it excavates, destroys; it digs ‘behind’ the
text, to find a sub-text which is the true one” (S. Sontag 1961, p. 6). She then
uses Marxist and Freudian analyses as examples of this kind of destructive
interpretation.
Sontag believes that one ought to be sensitive to one’s response to art
(the paradigm example for her is literary art, a static art form) and to be alive
to it in all the ways that it is there to be responded to without doing violence
to the artwork by finding or inventing meanings for the work that are not
available in the experience of the work (see Sontag 1961, pp. 9-10). Thus she
prefers what she calls a “formalist” theory of interpretation above a “contentbased” one in which the interpreter hunts for the true meaning behind what
is actually there (Sontag 1961, pp. 12-14). Further, Sontag doesn’t think that
the artist’s intention that their work be either interpreted or not matters
because she thinks that artists are sometimes guilty of seeing their own work
through a work-altering interpretive lens (Sontag 1961, p. 9).
In his essay, ‘Deep Interpretation’, Arthur Danto notes that
responding to a work via sensory experience or passions alone (a theory he
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attributes to Schopenhauer) offers no way to understand the sort of
conceptual art in which the artwork is perceptually indiscernible from its
material counterpart (Danto 2005, pp. 37-39). Here Danto’s paradigm
artwork is a painting or sculpture. He thinks this kind of perception is
biologically basic and does not include enhancement by cultural resources. In
addition, Danto interprets Sontag’s criticism of interpretation as not being
against interpretation altogether but against the kind of interpretation that
overdetermines the work of art. He does not think, for example, that she
would be against the sort of interpretation that he calls surface interpretation
– that just consists of identifying the text as the work of art it claims to be in
historical context along with some surrounding identifications that are
roughly in line with some basic and apparent artistic purposes (such as the
title of the piece for example). He that thinks what Sontag objects to is deep
interpretation – which he says involves a kledon, a Greek term for the
situation where “a speaker makes utterances ‘that are more than the speaker
realizes’…” (Danto 2005, p. 54). Here an artist or author is in no better
position than anyone else to say what the artwork means, since meanings are
abstracted that may not have even been available to the author (see Danto
2005, p. 51). An example of this would be to say that artwork X represents
Freud’s view of sexual repression when that theory did not exist when the
artwork was created.
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Danto agrees with Sontag that deep interpretation can “overdetermine” the work (Danto 2005, p. 66). And yet, in his essay, ‘The
Appreciation and Interpretation of Works of Art’, he says the following:
My view, historically, is that interpretations are discovered and
that interpretive statements are true or false. My view,
philosophically, is that interpretations constitute works of art
[as works of art], so that you do not, as it were, have the
artwork on one side and the interpretation on the other.
(Danto 2005, p. 23, bracketed material mine).
Thus, it seems that Danto holds both that interpretive statements about an
artwork are true or false, and that it is the process of interpretation itself that
determines an artwork’s meaning as a work of art – it constitutes it. Here he
says, “Interpretation is in effect the level with which an object is lifted out of
the real world and into the artworld, where it becomes vested in often
unexpected raiment” (Danto 2005, p. 39). We know from his “artworld”
paper and from his subsequent work following it that Danto’s view is that the
person qualified to make this interpretation is an expert in the artworld to
which the work of art belongs (Danto 1964 and Danto 1981). But this
“unexpected raiment” calls to mind the children’s story, ‘The Emperor’s New
Clothes’, where it takes a child to point out that all the adults are claiming to
see something that simply isn’t there.
Joseph Margolis identifies two modes of interpretation for artworks:
1) interpretation for purposes of historical identification, and 2)
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interpretation that counts as part of understanding the nature of a particular
work of art. In short, Margolis acknowledges that one has to treat an artwork
as stable for purposes of historical identification but he does not believe that
this means that the meaning of that artwork is ever singular or determinate,
and therefore it cannot lend itself to one true interpretation (Margolis 2001,
pp. 105-106). Instead, Margolis has a pluralist and relativist view of artwork
interpretation, one in which changes in culture can create multiple “truthlike” interpretations of any given artwork at various points of time due to the
artwork’s nature as an evolving cultural artifact that has meanings that
change due to changes in culture (Margolis 2001, p. 127; 1995, p. 28; and
1999, pp. 84-85). Margolis uses the term “Intentional properties”, with an
upper-case “I”, to refer to those features of artworks that are put into an
artwork by an artist and that have semiotic meaning to both the artist and to
his interpreting culture (Margolis 1999, pp. 60-62, and p. 73). On Margolis’
view, for example, it would be “truth-like” to say that a painting depicting
Christ was depicting both the sense of who Christ was that existed at the time
and place of the artwork’s creation and the person who Christ was as
understood by historically later or different cultural interpretations of Christ.
He calls this sort of interpretation “truth-like” rather than true because he
does not think that artworks as cultural artifacts have discoverable
properties that can have true interpretations that last for all time and that
are not true-for-x, with x being the interpreting culture. Thus, an artist on
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Margolis’ view does not have full control over the meaning of the work that
he creates.
To sum up, on Margolis’ view an artwork’s meaning lies in its
properties or features that are perceivable in the artwork by an interpreting
culture. Margolis’ theory too, primarily focuses on literary texts, paintings,
and sculptures, although Margolis also holds that intentional properties exist
in music, dance, and in all other art forms and activities that he construes as
lingual utterances. Since this perception varies by culture it is not tied to
human biology alone, such as in the limited sort of biological sensory
experience that Danto attributes to Schopenhauer. Indeed, for Margolis
perception of an artwork would accommodate conceptual art by
apprehending its meaning through whatever clues are available to aid that
comprehension that are given to them by the artist – such as the artwork’s
title or other direction for viewing the piece provided by the artist. For
example, if one can see that a poem is a haiku, one could at least make use of
any culturally-available interpretive practices for haikus. It might be a haiku
even if the artist didn’t intend that to be the case – if it happened to be in
haiku form in a coincidental way. Sontag would probably say that it would be
wrong for a Margolian interpreter to call the poem a haiku but not wrong to
point out the perceptual, formal features of that haiku. And Danto would
probably say its haiku-ness was true under a philosophical (deep) but not
historical (surface) interpretation.
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In light these views on artwork interpretation I will now construct an
open and working definition of interpretation to use in connection with
dance performing that shares some continuity with the standard theories of
artwork interpretation mentioned earlier. This has the advantage of not
departing too greatly from how interpretation in art is known and
understood in Western cultural scholarship, although as we shall see the fact
that dance involves a moving, thinking, embodied dancer may change the
suitability of a theory of interpretation culled from those that have primarily
static art forms in mind. Bracketing for now – we will return to this later –
the question of what qualifies as interpretanda (by which is meant properly
interpretable material) for the performer’s interpretation in dance
performance this paper holds that interpretation in art is at least (but not
only) this:
•

The process by which an interpreter evaluates and uses customary
artworld interpretanda in order to identify the meaning of the art
product at issue.

This is a view of interpretation of art that gives credence to Danto’s view of
artworld expertise. For dance purposes the relevant artworld would be the
danceworld, in which expert interpretative ability would acknowledged in
qualified dance critics as well as in other kinds of danceworld scholars. The
“art product at issue” refers to the dance performance. The term “art
product” is used instead of “artwork” in order to escape any explicit or
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implied commitment to an ontological view that holds that a dance artwork
must be a textual or abstract structure.
This working definition (by which I mean that it is provisional only) is
broad enough to accommodate all three of the views on interpretation in art
mentioned earlier. Formalist, surface, deep, and culturally relative and
pluralistic interpretations of art are all customary kinds of interpretation in
art, including dance. This definition is also an open one so that it can allow
for newly emergent interpretive practices to develop out of or in reaction to
customary ones.
We turn now to a discussion of what kinds of interpretive activities
and roles exist in the practices of creating and performing dance in order to
identify what, precisely, the performing dancer might do that is in line with
the working definition of interpretation now provided.
This section will evaluate two activities a dancer may engage in
during preparation for dance performance. They are as follows:
1) Evaluation and use of any pre-existing choreographic notes or
directions (which may not rise to the level of a notated “score” in the
technical sense); and
2) Evaluation and use of any notes or guidelines from a director (the
director may or may not also be the choreographer).
1) is a situation in which the dance performer independently evaluates any
pre-existing choreographic notes or directions. She analyzes the detailed
libretto and notes on verbal indicators from Jean Coralli and Jules Perrot’s
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original choreography for Giselle, for example, which took place in Paris in
1841, in preparation for performing the title role.
In 2), interpretation of any notes or guidelines from a director, let us
imagine the case where the dance performer does not use any independent
interpretation of original choreographic guidelines for Giselle, or that if she
does so it is only with the express or tacit approval of the performance
director. This situation is one where:
1) The structure and format of the dance performances is created by the
performance director, who may or may not be the choreographer (he
may, for example, be either restaging the Coralli and Perrot
choreography or, like Marius Petipa did for The Imperial Ballet of
Russia, he may provide new choreography for Giselle altogether);
2) The plan or framework for the dance performance is set in advance by
the director. Here there is a continuum between dances where:
a. The dance has fully set directions, where all or nearly all of the
steps and stylistic and expressive nuances are determined
ahead of time and executed as closely as possible; and
b. Some themes or ideas for where to begin are available to the
dance performer but the rest of the dance performance
features are left up to the discretion or improvisation.
Now let us apply the working definition of interpretation provided earlier.
That definition, remember, was the following. Interpretation in art is:
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•

The process by which an interpreter evaluates and uses customary
artworld interpretanda in order to identify the meaning of the art
product at issue.

Applying this definition to interpretation by the dance performer, and
inserting the kind of dance performer roles provided above, we get this:
•

The process by which the dancer [interpreter] evaluates and uses a preexisting score or plan from a choreographer and/or director [both
customary interpretanda in danceworld practice] in order to identify
the meaning of the dance performance.

In practice, dance performers do sometimes directly interpret pre-existing
scores or choreographic plans. Dance anthropologist Anya Peterson Royce,
for example, points out that ballet dancers at the Kirov school were trained in
acting so that they could interpret roles directly from texts or choreographic
plans without necessarily relying on directions from directors (Royce 1984,
p. 127).
In addition, dancers do often follow director’s plans rather than the
original choreographers’. This is true in the case, for example, where a
director restages a dance for contemporary audiences, as has been seen in
many different versions of Swan Lake and The Nutcracker, with the new
versions identified with the new choreographer’s name in most cases (for
example, Mats Eks’ Swan Lake, or Akram Khan’s Giselle).
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If we think that dance performers are interpreters in these ways then
the performance an audience sees has already been through one interpretive
process before they get to interpret it. But IS this what’s going on?
Graham McFee holds that one broad usage of the term “interpretation” in the
performing arts refers to the performer’s interpretation of the piece
performed, such as in Pollini’s interpretation of Schoenberg’s Six Little Piano
Pieces Opus 19 or in Nureyev’s interpretation of Sleeping Beauty (McFee
1992, p. 100 and p. 103). “Here”, McFee says, “the interpretation typically
consists in some set of actions performed, or, as we might way, in producing
that object in which the witnessable work consists” (McFee 1992, p. 100). In
both music and dance McFee thinks that the job of the performer is to
perform the work of art, which for McFee, is the abstract structure as
evidenced by an at-least-in-principle notation (McFee 2011, 168-171). He
acknowledges that different performer’s interpretations can bring out or
highlight different features of the underlying work, and that by doing so they
can create a distinctive performance and even contribute to the properties of
performances, via what he calls their “craft-mastery” (McFee 1992, p. 123;
2013, p. 29 and p. 35; see also 2011, p. 155). But McFee also thinks that
constraints on the role of the performer are “actually provided either by the
notation or some notation-equivalent,” clarifying later that the object for
interpretation is the structure but that the notation makes this explicit and
that the constraints on performance will change “as notation systems change
or different ones are employed” (McFee 1992, 102, 104, and 106). He
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categorically denies that this “interpretation” is creative in any way, and this
means that the dance performer is not an artist and not someone who can be
credited with co-authorship of dances (McFee 1992, 104; 2011, 168-173;
2013, p. 29). McFee also says that “the performer’s interpretation does not
really constitute a level of interpretation at all” (by which he presumably
means critical interpretation in a formal sense) because he sees the
performer as just the necessary vehicle for making the dance work of art
available for criticism (McFee 1992, p. 124). The choreographer creates the
dance structure, the dance performer makes it visible to a critic, and the
critic determines its meaning (McFee 1992, pp. 152-154).
McFee holds further that if the dance performer does more than just provide
notation-acceptable embellishments on the abstract structure, then this is “a
case where a new work of art is brought into being...” (McFee 1992, 108).
According to McFee, this can happen in the case of a virtuoso performance
that McFee says is a “poor performance” when it distracts the spectator from
the structure of the dance (McFee 2011, p. 180). Or it can be a case where
improvisational activity by the dance performer does not fall within the
acceptable structure of the work. This creates a new performable (and
ostensibly re-performable) work of art (McFee 2011, p. 156 and p. 163).
McFee denies that “a one-off work with a performing character” is a work of
art – calling it instead a “happening” (McFee 2011, p. 156 and pp. 160-161;
2013, footnote 2; c.f. Davies 2011, pp. 143-148).
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If McFee thinks that dance performers can create new artworks
through embellishments or other improvisational activity, then it is hard to
see how he can simultaneously claim that they are not creative or artists.
Presumably McFee would answer that they are not artists when they stick to
their role of performing, which he limits to instantiating the structure. Doing
more than this turns performers into composers or choreographers of a new
work of art. (McFee gives no guidance, however, on how we are to view that
new work of art as a work of art, or identify it as that new work going
forward.)
One difficulty here, as noted, is that dancers don’t always plan their
performances ahead of time. But even when they do it’s not clear that they do
so with either the original choreographer or a subsequent choreographer’s
or director’s plan in mind. Ruth Eshel, a dance philosopher, choreographer,
and dance critic, says that the process of performing includes working out
both the technical and artistic aspects of a role in a two-part process:
The first is a systematic, logical and cognitive grappling with
the challenges that the steps pose. The second an individual
artistic interpretation of the part, stemming from the private
world of imagination, emotion, energy and associations of the
individual artist. (Eshel 1995, p. 87).
If imagination and associations of the individual artist are involved, and if it
comes from a private world, it’s not clear to what extent this complies with
McFee’s view of performing as instantiating a structure.
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Let us consider, now, the possibility that there are other sorts of things that
the dance performer is doing that falls outside of making the dance visible to
the critics. Some dance theorists hold, as I do, that dance performers are
often creative, are often artists accordingly, and as such are often co-authors
of dances, rather than merely “craft-masters” (cf. McFee 2011, p. 181 and p.
184, and 2013, p. 28). New York Times dance critic Anna Kisselgoff has noted
that 19th-century ballet was designed around the personalities of its lead
dancers. She does say that in contemporary dance roles are more important
than the performers in it, that performers are “instruments” of
choreographers, but she also notes that “unless the dancer ‘performs’ rather
than merely executes the steps, the choreography will fail” (Kisselgoff 1978,
p. D17). Kisselgoff also says that in the case of Balanchine ballet, the work of
the dance performer, such as adding stylistic nuances “does require its own
kind of artistry” (Kisselgoff 1978, p. D17). Dance scholar and choreography
professor Larry Lavender also points out that “even in cases in which an
artist has a specific meaning or message in mind [he thinks that in many
cases they do not], a work of art, as it takes shape, tends to take on a life and
character of its own as the artist engages with his or her materials … be they
colors, musical tones, words, or movements” (Lavender 1995, p. 27,
bracketed material mine). Choreographers often use the dancers’ created
movements, steps or stylistic nuances as part of the building blocks for what
will be the eventual dance, in many cases making dancers’ contributions
highly visible, rather than “relatively invisible”, as McFee says that they are
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(McFee 2011, p. 180). Shirley McKechnie and Catherine Stevens point out, for
example, that dancers and choreographers in contemporary dance often
improvise together in order to create and select the materials out of which a
dance is formed (McKechnie and Stevens 2009, p. 40). Further, they note that
such dance ensemble collaborations can create what they call “evolving
dynamical systems” and that it is these that often result in a self-organizing
form of a dance (McKechnie and Stevens 2009, pp. 41-43). The ensemble as a
unit, rather than any individual within it, is therefore the true author of the
dance.
There is also evidence to show that most performances are not
constrained by notations, even notations-in-principle. The one exception is
the performances for which a choice has been made to be historically faithful
to a given structure but this situation happens in just a fraction of actual
cases. McFee does acknowledge the weakness of notation in dance practice
but then suggests that this shows a weakness in the notational systems
themselves rather than a weakness in a philosophic system that construes
the abstract structure, as evidenced by notation, as the only possible
candidate for evaluation of dance-as-art (see McFee 2013, pp. 35-41).
Perhaps one reason why better notation has not been created is because
there is a critical mass of dance choreographers and performers who do not
recognize the need or value of such a notation; indeed, they have been
getting along just fine without it. Indeed, any pre-existent elements that
might be used as the springboard for a dance is more commonly
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communicated through “multimodal recording and archives of dance works”
and via the dancers’ bodies, which are themselves “repositories of the dance
works that they have composed and/or performed” (McKechnie and Stevens
2009, p. 45; see also Eshel 1995, particularly at 84, for examples of dancers
who use other dancers’ performances, including stylistic and other
performer-contributed elements, rather than the structures of scores
whether real or in principle, as the model for their performances).
Another consideration is that sometimes dance performers do not always
fully cognize or understand how they will perform a role ahead of time, as in
the case of many of the dancers who were trained in the neo-classical style of
New York City Ballet director, choreographer, and teacher George
Balanchine. Dance anthropologist and comparative literature scholar Anya
Peterson Royce, in her book Movement and Meaning: Creativity and
Interpretation in Ballet and Mime, points to dance critic Arlene Croce’s
observation (substantiated in the autobiographies of Suzanne Farrell, Merrill
Ashley, Edward Villella and others) that Balanchine often encouraged both
individual style in his dancers and gave them the room to spontaneously add
their own stylistic flourishes during performance (Royce 1984, p. 121, citing
Croce 1979; see also Eshel 1995, p. 86, and Kisselgoff, 1978, D17, for more on
this). Royce refers to this as “spontaneous in-the-performance
interpretation” (Royce 1984, p. 121).
Our working definition of interpretation, however, includes the
phrase “…in order to identify the meaning of the performance” which is there

17

to capture the sense from the art interpretation theorists earlier that
interpretation is about identification of meaning. Thus, on the traditional
accounts of interpretation of art canvassed earlier the interpreter can say to
herself or to someone else, “The meaning of X is Y”. But is a Balanchine
dancer doing that? Is she providing an account of the meaning of X and
saying, through their dancing, that it is Y? This marks one of the difficulties of
treating interpretation in dance performing as an extension of critical
interpretation.
Perhaps what would help here is an account of meaning identification
in which meaning is intuited, identified and conveyed in bodily and felt
rather than in consciously decided ways. One where the “thinking” involved
is embodied and not necessarily the kind of meaning that can be put into
words. To capture the moving-while-doing aspect of dance performing we’d
also need a kind of thinking that is live and online rather than reflective and
contemplative. This chapter cannot, for space and time reasons, make and
defend adequately the case for such an expanded view of the thinking-whiledoing nature of a dancer’s agency, although I have done so elsewhere (see
Bresnahan 2014). Suffice it to say now that if the term understanding were
expanded in such a way then we might call performing Balanchine ballet
interpretation.
We have now come to a crossroads where a decision must be made as to
whether to push this line of thinking and so subsume the Balanchine neo-classical
process described above under the term interpretation. What might be the costs
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and benefits of calling this “interpretation”? On the benefit side would be that
dancers are credited with understanding what they are doing and are not treated as
merely non-thinking puppets. This seems dancer-friendly and gives credit to the
difficulties of dance performance that are minded and not mechanical. Another
point on the benefit side is that this sort of activity is commonly referred to as
“interpretation” in dance practice and it’s helpful for interdisciplinary work when
terms are kept constant between disciplines. (For usage of the term
“interpretation” in this way see Acocella 2005 and Barnes 1975). On the cost
side is that an embodied thinking-while-doing process that dance performers are
involved in gets subsumed (and possibly lost) under the term “interpretation”
when it may in fact be the case that it is a separate process worthy of exploration
and consideration.
Suppose now that a significant part of what a dancer does in
performance is not the conveying of understanding after an interpretive
effort, but a performance that is just the output of how the dancer finds
herself moving through it. What if the dancer is merely adding her own
artistically trained and natural instinctual and embodied sense of how to
move within any frameworks provided for the piece? And what if this is a
vital, ineliminable, and non-contingent aspect of dance performance, without
which its full meaning cannot be identified or understood by an audience?
If what we think that what matters most to understanding the nature of
dance is the pre-existing plan or structure then it makes sense to hold, as
McFee does, that if the dancer adds too much of their own contribution then
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they are performing the given structure poorly and creating a new structure.
Indeed, viewed in this way then the dance performer would be guilty of the
kind of altering interpretation that Sontag decries, that Danto calls the sort of
“deep interpretation” that overdetermines the artwork, and that Margolis
might say either does or does not go beyond the meaning that is
understandable to the audience as the interpreting culture. If we think,
however, that what matters most in many cases is the dancers’ contribution
to a distinctive artistic experience for the audience, then we would be better
off viewing the dancer in these cases as a co-author and co-creative artist
rather than either a poor interpreter or someone who has hijacked one dance
in order to turn it into another. Sondra Fraleigh, for example, describes dance
as “a special case of voluntary motion, imbued with the aesthetic intentions
of performers and the larger intentionality (purposes) of each particular
dance” (Fraleigh 1999, p. 196). Fraleigh thus treats the voluntary motion and
aesthetic intentions of the dancers together with “the larger intentionality of
the dance”, which she has specifically not reduced to pre-existing intentions
or structures of a choreographer or director. Further, dance performance
styles are often so unique and individual that they cannot be copied by other
dancers, even when they try their best to do so. Dancer and teacher Maria
Fay attributes this individuality to “a particular dancer’s individual approach,
charisma, physique and talent” (Fay 1996). She cites an example of a highly
trained ballet dancer who tried to copy another performer’s style but who
was able to copy only the images created by the other dancer but not her
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movement personality. In addition, some particular dances have hinged
heavily on a particular individual dance performer or set of performers.
Dancer, director, and choreographer Robert Helpmann, for example, has
noted that some of Frederick Ashton’s ballets were so influenced by
particular dancers that the ballets would lose something if the dancer left
(see Royce 1984, pp. 124-125, quoting Helpmann 1971, p. 96). Dance critic
Marcia Siegel has also observed that the continuous adagio in Twyla Tharp’s
As Time Goes By was “an achievement due in large part to Larry Grenier, who
created the role…”, adding that “Grenier was indulgent in space, letting his
motion slide easily into its own fluctuating rhythms” (Krasnow 1994, pp. 1718, quoting Siegel 1979, pp. 356-357). And there are many other examples of
this phenomenon – one need only to think of any outstanding singular
dancers who made singular contributions to the roles they initiated (such as
Nijinsky in La Spectre de la Rose, Judith Jamison in “Cry” from Alvin Ailey’s
Revelations, or Martha Graham as Medea for starters).
What all this means is that the term interpretation as used in
traditional aesthetics philosophy with paradigm instances of art objects that
were static, non-moving, and non-embodied in a human performer –
painting, sculpture, literary texts and the like -- might be too narrow to
adequately capture the full scope of the practice of dance performing.
In conclusion, in practice dance performing is not just interpretive.
Some of dance performing practice is not pre-planned, is not conceptually
understood, and is better characterized as the trained and expressive output
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of a dancer who moves in the particular embodied, creative and agentive way
that includes customary additions to and alterations of a dance as it comes
into being and as it is performed. If one thinks that this can and does affect
the understanding, experience, and appreciation the audience has in ways
that typically contribute to rather than detract from a dance performance
then the idea that these sorts of departures from structure make the
performance “bad” is inapt. Indeed, dancers are in an important number of
cases valued for a creative, expressive contribution to what the dance
performance is. Dancers are certainly sometimes executors, and sometimes
interpreters, but they also often do produce something that is individual,
new, trained, and skilled, and in this sense, they are artists.

Aili Bresnahan
University of Dayton
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University symposium.
Bibliography
Acocella, J., 2005, ‘Critic’s Notebook: Petrouchka Redux’, The New Yorker
(June 13).
Barnes, C., 1975, “The Ballet: More Than One Way to Dance ‘Giselle’”, the New
York Times (May 1).

22

Bresnahan, A., 2014, ‘Improvisational Artistry in Live Dance Performance As
Embodied and Extended Agency’, Dance Research Journal, 46: 84-94.
Croce, A., 1979, Afterimages, New York: Vintage Books.
Danto, A. C., 1964, ‘The Artworld’, The Journal of Philosophy, 61: 571-584.
Danto, A. C., 1981. The Transfiguration of the Commonplace, Cambridge:
Harvard University Press.
Danto, A. C., 2005, The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art, New York:
Columbia University Press.
Davies, D., 2011, Philosophy of the Performing Arts, Massachusetts: WileyBlackwell.
Eshel, R., 1995, ‘The Art of Performing’, Israel Dance Quarterly 5: 82-87.
Fay, M., 1996, ‘I Want to be ME!’, Dancing Times (London), June.
Fraleigh, S. H., 1999, ‘Witnessing the Frog Pond’, in S. H. Fraleigh and P.
Hanstein (eds.), Researching Dance: Evolving Modes of Inquiry, 188224, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Helpmann, R., 1971, in Z. Dominic and J.S. Gilbert, Frederick Ashton: A
Choreographer and His Ballets, London: Harrap.
Kisselgoff, A., 1978, ‘Dance View: Performance vs. Choreography’, the New
York Times (Feb. 5).
Krasnow, D., 1994, ‘Performance, Movement, and Kinesthesia’, Impulse, 2: 1623.
Lavender, L., 1995, ‘Understanding Interpretation’, Dance Research Journal,
23: 25-33.
23

Margolis, J., 1995, Interpretation Radical But Not Unruly: The New Puzzle of
the Arts and History, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.
Margolis, J., 1999, What, After All, Is a Work of Art, University Park, PA: The
Pennsylvania State University Press.
Margolis, J., 2001, Selves and Other Texts: The Case for Cultural Realism,
University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
McFee, G., 1992, Understanding Dance, London: Routledge.
McFee, G., 2011, The Philosophical Aesthetics of Dance: Identity, Performance
and Understanding, Hampshire: Dance Books Ltd.
McFee, G., 2013, “‘Admirable Legs’, or The Dancer’s Importance for the
Dance”, in J. Bunker, A. Pakes, and B. Rowell (eds.), Thinking Through
Dance: The Philosophy of Dance Performance and Practices, 22-45,
Hampshire: Dance Books Ltd.
McKechnie, S., and C. J. Stevens, 2009, ‘Visible Thought: Choreographic
Cognition in Creating, Performing, and Watching Contemporary
Dance’, in J. Butterworth and L. Wildschut (eds.), Contemporary
Choreography: A Critical Reader, 38-51, Abingdon: Routledge.
Royce, A. P., 1984, Movement and Meaning: Creativity and Interpretation in
Ballet and Mime, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Siegel, M., 1979, The Shapes of Change: Images in American Dance, Boston:
Houghton Mifflin.
Sontag, S., 1961, Against Interpretation and Other Essays, New York: Picador.

24

